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The writer is director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
It is hard to miss the optimism and euphoria in Tel Aviv, Washington and not a few western capitals. The crushing of Iran’s power will deliver stability and peace in the Middle East, many like to believe. US envoy Steve Witkoff has announced that several, still unnamed, countries will normalise relations with Israel shortly, though these may not be Arab states. Some Israeli strategists have already proposed an “Abraham Shield Plan”, which would enshrine Israeli dominance and secure political and economic benefits without presenting any concessions related to Palestinian statehood. Above all, Israel shows no desire for a negotiated end to the Gaza war.
Contrast that with the stupor and sense of dread pervading the Gulf region, which just experienced its fifth major conflagration in five decades. After the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the 1990-91 Gulf war, the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq and its bloody aftermath and years of damaging intra-Gulf disputes, there was hope that an agenda of global integration and regional prosperity would shield the region from turmoil. Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE in May was carefully designed to get US buy-in for this vision.
Instead, and despite all their efforts, Israel attacked Iran two weeks ago, followed by a US strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran’s retaliation against a US base in Qatar, however calibrated and choreographed, produced images of Qatari nationals and foreign workers running for safety. US-backed Qatari air defences performed well and there were no casualties. But the shock to a country that hosted the football World Cup a few years ago and for neighbours who pride themselves on stability, safety and ease of business is unmistakable. The Gulf states must now plan for a prolonged period of uncertainty and instability. From their perspective, the war has been inconclusive.
Regardless of the extent of the damage done to Iran’s nuclear facilities, the next years will be shaped by whether Tehran leaves the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whether Israel and the US continue bombing and whether the Iranians build a rudimentary nuclear device. What Gulf states once saw as a threat manageable through a deal — an Iran perennially below the nuclear threshold and with curtailed regional reach — is now an intractable one that will affect their own stability for decades. This will keep the Gulf states and those who want to invest or live there nervous.
All analogies are imperfect and self-serving, but consider the following one: today looks eerily like Iraq in 1991. A militarised regime has survived, albeit in a weakened form. It can no longer project force and may have to tame its rebellious periphery, but it can still disrupt its neighbourhood. Domestic and exiled opposition forces are weak. And its leaders still believe that regime change is the undeclared goal.
Contrary to the 1990s, when a globally dominant US took ownership of the management of Iraq and had a legal basis for doing so, today’s America is uninterested in any such commitment. Having demonstrated US power more emphatically than any military parade could, Trump has neither the interest nor the focus to pursue a complex and sustainable settlement that simultaneously constrains and integrates Iran regionally. Even if he did, Israel would probably resist such a design for it would curtail its own freedom of action. Israel is primarily interested in operating unimpeded wherever it fights. What matters is that its aircraft can fly at will and its spies can operate anywhere, and for foes as well as partners to accept this unconditionally. A weakened Iran will be too busy licking its wounds and settling internal scores to risk high-stakes diplomacy except to buy time.
Its nuclear brinkmanship may have backfired badly, but it remains a card Tehran can play. It will also have to rethink its defence posture. Deterring and attacking Israel through medium-range ballistic missiles and militias has failed. Investing in homeland defence remains expensive and even more difficult: Russia has proven to be far less than an all-weather friend and will not prioritise Iran’s needs. China is now hyped as Iran’s next best bet, but Beijing will have learnt from this conflict that less exposure to Middle East politics serves it better. The remaining tools in Iran’s arsenal are the more accurate and plentiful short-range systems (missiles but also drones) that are useful only within the Gulf region.
All this means that the Gulf states must now spend more time and attention on managing Iran. They are likely to seek better air defences to match Israel’s impressive shield and more missiles to have credible means of deterrence. This ensures lasting defence relations with western states. But despite having both been attacked by Tehran in recent years, Doha and Riyadh are more inclined to show patience and magnanimity these days. There will be political statements, visits and economic inducements — as well as greater criticism of the US and Israel. Ironically, Israel’s success against Iran further reduces Saudi Arabia’s already-waning desire to normalise with Israel.
While discussions in western capitals depict Iran as a spent force, the country will remain a threat to its neighbours and at the centre of conversations across the Middle East for years to come.
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