Receive free European Union updates
We’ll send you a myFT Daily Digest email rounding up the latest European Union news every morning.
Many animals hibernate. Politicians in Europe aestivate: during August, activity in Brussels and many EU capitals drops to a barely life-sustaining level. But, as in the animal kingdom, the function is to gather strength for what is going to be an exhausting political year.
It is the last summer break before the European parliament elections next June. That leaves little time before unfinished policy business gets overtaken by electioneering. Already, the pan-European political groupings and their national member parties are busy positioning themselves for maximum advantage.
The relative performance of the party groups in the European election will influence the make-up of the next commission, and the strength of the different sides in the political battles to be waged in the next five-year cycle. We are beginning to glimpse the possible consequences.
For example, the centre-right is testing the waters of a rapprochement with the nativist/nationalist right, in the process presenting itself as a commonsense brake on a green industrial transition many of its putative voters think is going too fast or costing too much. Meanwhile, the gains made by the Greens last time round look set to be undone.
Then there are the national ballots coming up. The Slovaks elect their new parliament in September, the Poles in October and the Dutch in November. National elections matter as much if not more than the European parliament for EU policymaking. They determine the composition of the council, where national governments strike hard-fought compromises over common policy.
So when the political complexion of national governments changes, the orientation of the EU’s policymaking supertanker can alter, too. Within the past year, Sweden and Finland have replaced centre-left with centre-right coalitions. Last month’s Spanish election was inconclusive but a similar shift — or yet another election — cannot be ruled out.
Single countries can also have outsize importance for particular policy areas. Poland’s election will be a stand-off over the country’s relationship with Europe, the rule of law and liberalism. Slovakia is one of the bloc’s weakest links in its united stance against Russia.
The Netherlands usually punches far above its weight, but its influence after the departure of Mark Rutte, one of Europe’s longest-serving national leaders, is anyone’s guess.
Consider the reform of the EU rules governing public finances: a compromise approach by the Netherlands and Spain last year established the likely rough landing zone for negotiations. But by the time talks conclude, the pairs of premiers and finance ministers who crafted the approach could all be gone.
It should go without saying, then, that all these elections matter for where Europe is heading. It is messy, of course, because of the myriad ways in which voters’ choices in criss-crossing electoral cycles affect policy outcomes. Yet many people look upon this complex lattice of layered electoral contests, and draw the conclusion that the EU suffers from too little democracy.
The complaint about “democratic deficit” is old, yet has remained curiously unaffected by the many changes in the way the EU is actually governed. It has survived the move to direct election of the European parliament, that body’s proven ability to reject European commissioner candidates or force out an entire commission, more majority voting in the council and the introduction of EU-level citizens’ initiatives. It is almost as if those who bleat about the democratic deficit take little interest in how the EU really works.
That is not to say things could not be better. Low turnout rates in European elections signal that, in some countries, voters feel disconnected from the democratic process. But turnout has been on the rise, while EU democracy works through the council, too, backed by significant levels of participation in national ballots.
A deeper objection is that there cannot be sufficient democracy while there is no “demos”, or self-identified European people. But this argument would imply that there can never be any concerted international decision that is democratic. Turn the question around and ask what, in the real world, democratic decision-making for many countries could look like. Any answer would be recognisably related to the EU set-up.
So get your rest this August, and prepare to revel in the glorious mess of actually existing cross-border democracy.
Read the full article here
